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Abstraction and Epistemic Entitlement: 
On the Epistemological Status of Hume's Principle 
CRISPIN WRIGHT 
 
§1  The abstractionist programme of foundations for classical mathematical theories is, 
like its traditional logicist ancestors, first and foremost an epistemological project. Its official 
aim is to demonstrate the possibility of a certain uniform mode of a priori1 knowledge of the 
basic laws of arithmetic, real and complex analysis, and set theory (or as much set theory as 
anyone might soberly suppose to be indeed knowable at all.2)  It is a further issue whether a 
successful execution of the abstractionist project for a particular branch of mathematics 
would amount to a local vindication of logicism in some interesting sense of that term. 
Traditional logicism aimed to show that mathematical knowledge could be accomplished 
using only analytic definitions and theses of pure logic and hence is not merely a priori if 
logic is but is effectively a proper part of logic. Abstractionism, however, adds abstraction 
principles to the base materials employed in the traditional logicist project—principles that, at 
least in the central, interesting cases, are neither pure analytic definitions3 nor theses of pure 
logic as conventionally understood. Thus, whatever significance they may carry for the 
prospects for logicism, in one or another understanding of that doctrine, the epistemological 
significance of technically successful abstractionist projects must turn, one would suppose, 
on the epistemological status of the abstraction principles used, with any demonstration of a 
                                                
1 I write in the context of something of a renaissance of scepticism about the theoretical interest of the 
notions of a priori knowledge and justification. I do not think the grounds for this renaissance are 
strong, but I will not challenge them here. 
2 My own, probably minority, view is that due sobriety will exclude the thought that the key principles 
required in the generation of the Cantorian transfinite hierarchy—Power and Union—are properly 
regarded as so known. But discussion of that must be deferred to another occasion.  
3 At least, not if we restrict the term, "definition", to principles that provide for the systematic 
eliminative paraphrase of all contexts in which the definiendum occurs. Hume's Principle, for instance, 
does not provide such resources for all the types of occurrence of the numerical operator required if 
arithmetic is to be founded upon it.  
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priority in particular being dependent on whether those principles can themselves rank as 
knowable a priori even if they are neither definitions, nor truths of logic, strictly understood. 
My primary focus here will be on this natural thought. 
§2 There is, of course, another major question about the significance of the successful 
execution of an abstractionist project, even for someone who is content that the possibility of 
a priori knowledge of a branch of pure mathematics would have thereby indeed been 
demonstrated—a question a version of which confronts any project in reconstructive 
epistemology. It is the question: what does it do for the status of our ordinary mathematical 
beliefs if, irrespective of how we actually arrive at them, some philosopher is able to work 
out an ideal route—very different to anything we actually do—and a persuasive case that if 
we were to follow it, we would indeed wind up with (much of) the knowledge that we think 
we actually have in the relevant region?  After all, one may in fact possess only a posteriori 
knowledge of things that can be known a priori. Can considerations be marshalled to make a 
case that successful abstractionist constructions can somehow "rub off" on the status of, for 
instance, our actual arithmetical knowledge? I think this question is long overdue much more 
explicit attention than it has received in the 'neo-Fregean' literature to date, but I shan’t say 
more about it here, except to remark that it already faced Frege.    
§3   I shall concentrate on the best worked out case: Hume's Principle and its credentials 
as an epistemological foundation for number theory.  The issues may seem straightforward:  
Do we (can we) know Hume's Principle at all? Do we (can we) know it a priori? If so, how?  
One quite attractive thought, advanced by Richard Heck,4 is that Hume's Principle, at least 
when the range of its higher-order variables is restricted to finite concepts, both represents a 
correct analytic digest of our intuitive conception of the structure of the natural numbers and 
provides a neat and natural account of how the content of arithmetical statements allows for 
their direct application in empirical contexts. (The application is provided for directly by the 
inclusion of appropriate empirical concepts within the range of the higher-order variables of 
                                                
4 Heck (1997). Related ideas are, as he remarks in ch. 1 of Heck (2011), developed in Demopoulos 
(1998) and (2000). See also Demopoulos (forthcoming). 
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the principle.)  (Finite) Hume's Principle thus has a strong case to be a correct codification of 
everything essential to pure and applied arithmetical thought.5   
 Attractive as this line may be, it puts the cart before the horse as far as the 
abstractionist project is concerned.  For that project, the justification for Hume's Principle 
cannot turn on its claim to reflect and encode an antecedent body of arithmetical knowledge.  
Rather its epistemological merits have to be accessible not just a priori but in advance of that 
body of knowledge.  In particular, it has to be possible, at least in principle, to learn of the 
truth of the Dedekind-Peano axioms by reasoning based on Hume's Principle. 
 So, for abstractionist purposes — and assuming we are not, as to his cost was Frege 
himself, in the market for its derivation from yet more ultimate and basic principles — it 
seems we need an account of how Hume's Principle might be known non-inferentially yet a 
priori by someone so far innocent of the axioms of arithmetic.  One immediately salient 
candidate account, accordingly, is the proposal that Hume's Principle's a priori credentials are 
those of a successful implicit definition: in effect, a stipulation whose effect is so to fix our 
concept of the meaning of the sole hitherto undefined term in its statement —the cardinality 
operator —that the truth of the principle comes to be knowable a priori just in virtue of our 
understanding of the prior logical vocabulary, our acquired understanding of the content of 
that expression, and our grasp of the syntax of the statement itself. 
 Bob Hale and I have previously defended this proposal.6  Defending it requires 
making out a connection between implicit definition and a priori knowledge in general.  It 
involves explaining how, in at least some cases, stipulation, or acceptance, of an implicit 
definition can so constrain the understanding of the very sentence(s) used in the definition 
that a priori knowledge of the truth of what is expressed is the result; and it then requires 
defending the more specific claim that Hume's Principle, and other good abstraction 
principles, rank as pukka implicit definitions of this kind.   
 Here I will revisit and qualify this proposal. Although I continue to have confidence 
in the idea that implicit definition can constitute one source of basic—non-inferential—a 
                                                
5 I shall omit the qualification "Finite" in what follows. 
6 Hale and Wright (2000). 
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priori warrant, I no longer want to rest on the claim that a complete vindication of the 
possibility of a priori knowledge of Hume's Principle in particular can be accomplished just 
on that basis. But nor, now, do I think that a complete vindication of the possibility of a priori 
knowledge of Hume's principle is anyway required before knowledge a priori of the basic 
laws of arithmetic, based on Hume's Principle, may legitimately be claimed. I now reject, in 
other words, the natural thought noted above that abstractionist foundations for arithmetic, 
based on Hume's Principle, can have their intended epistemological significance only if 
Hume's Principle is first known a priori. I will try to make good on that, perhaps slightly 
shocking, claim. 
§4   My confidence in the idea of implicit definition as a possible source of a priori 
knowledge in general is based in part on a vision of it as located in a wider epistemological 
setting which I have proposed in other work.7 Let me briefly outline it here. In his notes On 
Certainty, Wittgenstein writes the following: 
163. ......... We check the story of Napoleon, but not whether all the reports about him are 
based on sense-deception, forgery and the like.  For whenever we test anything, we are 
already presupposing something that is not tested.  Now am I to say that the experiment 
which perhaps I make in order to test the truth of a proposition presupposes the truth of the 
proposition that the apparatus I believe I see is really there (and the like)? 
Then, a little later, he observes that 
166. The difficulty is to realise the groundlessness of our believing. 
Compare 
253. At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded. 
And 
337. One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt.  
But that does not mean that one takes certain presuppositions on trust.  When I write a letter 
and post it, I take it for granted that it will arrive— I expect this. 
 If I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes.  
I have plenty of doubts, but not that.  If I do a calculation I believe, without any doubts, that 
the figures on the paper aren’t switching of their own accord, and I also trust my memory the 
whole time, and trust it without reservation. 
These remarks are characteristically gnomic but one point that seems salient in them is that to 
credit oneself with a warrant for a particular proposition acquired by the exercise of a certain 
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epistemic routine always rationally requires a willingness to make certain kinds of what 
Wittgenstein is calling presuppositions.8  Central among these presuppositions will be the 
proper functioning on the specific occasion of certain relevant cognitive capacities (eyesight, 
memory, and so on) and the suitability of the circumstances for their effective operation (no 
switching of figures, or forged documentation, etc.) But more, I take it that Wittgenstein is 
asserting not merely that such presuppositions are unavoidable but that one cannot, in the 
end, do better than to take some such things for granted: the claim to epistemic achievement 
must rest, in the end, on groundless presupposition.  
 I think it is clear that he is right. That is not to deny that, if one chose, one could 
investigate (at least some of) the presuppositions involved in a particular case.  I might go 
and have my eyesight checked, for example.  But the point is that in proceeding to such an 
investigation, one would then embark on a further enquiry which would entrain further 
presuppositions of the same general kinds (that my eyes are functioning properly now, when I 
read the opthalmologist's report, perhaps with my new glasses on; or that my ears are 
functioning properly when he tells me of his findings.) It is a necessary truth that wherever I 
achieve warrant for a particular proposition, —even warrant brutely externalistically 
conceived, if that is your taste, — I do so courtesy of the proper functioning of my cognitive 
powers and the amenability of the prevailing circumstances; so whenever I, as I think, get in 
position to claim to have achieved warrant, my claim must rest on my accepting specific 
presuppositions—about the proper functioning of my cognitive powers and the amenability 
of the circumstances—for which I will very often have, in context, no specific previously 
earned warrant.  This is unavoidable.  I may, in any particular case, set about earning such a 
warrant in turn—and that investigation may go badly, defeating the presuppositions that I 
                                                
7 Wright (2004), (2004b) and (forthcoming). 
8 Voraussetzungen. 
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originally made.  But whether it does or doesn’t go badly, it will have its own so far 
unfounded —unbegründet9 — presuppositions.  Again:  whenever cognitive achievement 
takes place, it can be claimed only in a context of specific presuppositions, some of which 
will not be the consolidated product of any cognitive achievement to date. 
 A first reaction to this point, once registered, is to feel that one's cognitive situation is 
suddenly extremely precarious.  If all claim to epistemic warrant rests on ungrounded 
presuppositions, haven't we just disclosed the materials for a new and rather ugly-looking 
sceptical paradox? For presumably our confidence in the things which we take ourselves to 
have verified in a particular context can rationally be no stronger than our justified 
confidence in the presuppositions of our having verified anything at all.  But now it appears 
that it will always be the case that some at least of these presuppositions are unevidenced and 
simply taken for granted. Suppose, for instance, I set myself to count the books on one of the 
shelves in my office and arrive at the answer, 26.  Then presumably the warrant thereby 
acquired for that answer can rationally be regarded as no stronger than the grounds I have for 
confidence that I counted correctly, and that my senses and memory were accordingly 
functioning as required throughout.  Yet I will have done nothing, we may suppose, to justify 
my confidence in these specific presuppositions.  Indeed, even if I have—even if I have 
subjected them to independent check—that independent check will have had its own 
presuppositions. So there must, it seems, be, as it were, ancestral presuppositions of the 
original enquiry for which I will have no specific evidence or claim of verification. Yet as 
soon as one such untested presupposition enters the chain, recognition that it does so—so 
runs the sceptical thought—should divest me of confidence in the specific enquiry for which 
it is a presupposition and thereby, in the style of falling dominoes, of confidence all the way 
                                                
9 On Certainty §253. 
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back to the original enquiry. How then can I responsibly claim to have achieved any genuine 
warrant at all?   
 There is, of course, a great deal to say about this sceptical line of thought. But for my 
purposes here I must simply offer the essence of what I take to be the correct line of reply.  
Since there is, necessarily, no such thing as a process of warrant acquisition for each of 
whose specific (ancestral) presuppositions warrant has already been earned, it should not be 
reckoned to be part of the proper concept of an acquired warrant that it somehow aspire to 
this incoherent ideal.10  Rather, we should view each and every cognitive project as 
unavoidably involving certain elements of adventure. In the end, I have to take a risk on the 
reliability of my senses and cognitive powers in general just as I take a risk on the continuing 
reliability of the steering, and the stability of the road surface every time I drive my car.  For 
as soon as I grant that I ought ideally to check the presuppositions of an enquiry, even in a 
context in which there is no particular reason for concern about them, then I should agree 
pari passu that I ought in turn to check the presuppositions of the check—which is one more 
enquiry after all—and so on indefinitely.  So then there will be no principled stopping point 
to the process of checking and the original project will never get started.  The right 
conclusion is not that the acquisition of genuine warrant is impossible, but rather that the 
sceptical anxiety is guilty of naiveté about what getting a warrant properly requires. Warrant 
may be taken to be acquired whenever an investigation is undertaken in a fully responsible 
manner.  Responsibility in general, however, cannot require more than taking all precautions 
which may reasonably be required. Ergo epistemic responsibility, in particular, cannot, per 
                                                
10 It may be felt that a defence is here owing of the description, "incoherent".  Has more been justified 
than merely "unattainable"? I will not attempt to argue the point in detail here. Suffice it to say that 
ideals of any kind, once recognized to be necessarily unattainable, can be rationally retained as ideals 
only when they can exercise some kind of asymptotic approachability — that is, roughly, when "Get as 
close as you can" is a sensible practical imperative. But "Eliminate all untested ancestral 
presuppositions" is not in that case: one never gets any closer to its completion, since each testing 
throws up new such presuppositions. 
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impossibile, involve an investigation of every presupposition whose falsity would defeat the 
claim to have acquired a warrant.   
 The implicit principle that makes the ultimate groundlessness of at least some of the 
presuppositions (ancestrally) involved in any cognitive project look like a fast track to 
scepticism is that any acquired warrant is no stronger than the weakest of one’s 
independently acquired sets of grounds for each of its (ancestral) presuppositions.  The 
crucial point I am tabling is that this principle is wrong. The right principle is rather 
something like this: that any acquired warrant may rightly be regarded as no stronger than the 
weakest of one’s independently acquired sets of grounds for each of its presuppositions—
excepting those presuppositions to which one is independently entitled without specific 
enquiry. 
§5  Very well. But which are the presuppositions to which one is, supposedly, entitled 
without specific enquiry? And what confers that status on them?  It will suit our purposes 
here to work with one specific notion of epistemic entitlement that I have proposed in other 
work.11  First, let's be a little more exact about the relevant notion of a presupposition. Define 
a cognitive project as a pair consisting of a question and a way of trying to answer it.  And let 
us say that  
 P is a presupposition of a particular cognitive project if to doubt P (in advance) would 
 rationally commit one to doubting the significance or competence of the project.   
Then the relevant kind of entitlement—entitlement of cognitive project—may be proposed to 
be any presupposition, P, of a cognitive project meeting the following two conditions:  
  
 (i) There is no extant reason to believe not-P  
and  
 (ii) Someone pursuing the relevant project who accepted that there is nevertheless an 
 onus to justify P would thereby implicitly commit themselves to an infinite regress of 
 justificatory projects, each concerned to vindicate presuppositions of its predecessor.   
                                                
11 Wright (2004) and (2004b). 
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No doubt that will stand refinement, but the general motif is clear enough.  If the attempt to 
vindicate the presuppositions of a cognitive project would raise presuppositions of its own of 
no more secure an antecedent status, … , and so on indefinitely, then we are rationally 
entitled to—may rationally trust in—the presuppositions of the original project without 
specific evidence in their favour. 
 This is a defeasible entitlement, of course. It is lost if a presupposition ceases to 
satisfy condition (i)— if sufficient evidence emerges against P to justify doubting it.  It is also 
hostage to the standing of the cognitive project concerned.  An entitlement of cognitive 
project is a warrant to trust in P if one undertakes the project.  There may be epistemic or 
other reason not to do so. Cognitive projects may be badly conceived—the method of 
answering may be flawed, or maladapted to the question concerned; or, like any other 
projects, a cognitive project may be pointless, or dangerous, or wasteful. It is, however a non-
negotiable part of our rational nature to undertake enquiry.12 The alternative is a form of 
intellectual (and thereby bodily) suicide. That simple consideration, I propose, issues in a 
right: to undertake cognitive projects absent reason to think that they will be ineffective, and 
absent overriding moral or other practical reason to abstain. Say that a project that meets that 
condition is unimpugned. Then when a cognitive project is unimpugned, and when P is a 
presupposition of it that meets conditions (i) and (ii) above, it is rationally permissible to 
undertake the project and rational for one who undertakes the project to trust that P is 
satisfied. 
 Let me run through the key ideas one more time.  Entitlements of cognitive project 
are all presuppositions in the sense I outlined —statements, that is, of conditions such that a 
doubt about their obtaining would be rationally sufficient for a doubt about the competence 
or significance of the particular cognitive project in hand.  What makes such a presupposition 
into an entitlement for someone undertaking the project, it is proposed, is a combination of 
three factors: first, that the project is unimpugned — that it is one that the agent has an 
undefeated right to undertake; second, that no information is possessed which would warrant 
                                                
12 Enoch and Schechter (2008) defend the interesting claim that enquiry is actually a rational 
obligation. It will, naturally, be supportive of my argument if they are right. 
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doubt that the presupposition was met; and third, that the attempt nonetheless to verify that it 
was met would implicate further presuppositions of no more secure an antecedent standing . . 
. and so on indefinitely. In such circumstances, to run the original cognitive project, and to 
take its findings on board, is, to be sure, to run a risk—but an unavoidable risk, a risk of a 
kind that it is part of being a living rational agent to be prepared to undertake and which go 
with the right to enquiry itself.  
§6  If this notion is in good order, the next question is: what is the range of such 
entitlements? We have in effect already noted two categories of potentially entitled 
presupposition. 
 First, in all circumstances where there is no specific reason to think otherwise, the 
stated conditions will entail that we are normally each of us entitled to take it, without special 
investigative work, that our cognitive faculties (senses, intellect and memory) are functioning 
properly, at least to the extent that we would need (ancestrally) to depend upon them to 
conduct an effective check.  
 Second, there will be a class of entitled presuppositions concerning the general 
epistemic cooperativeness of the cognitive environment.  My eyes may, on a particular 
occasion, be functioning well enough yet my acquisition of visually-based knowledge may be 
frustrated by the character of the background conditions:  perhaps the local environment is 
populated by barn facades, mules cleverly disguised to look like zebras, and hi-tech robotic 
doppelgänger of my friends and colleagues.  Or again, my intellect and senses may be 
functioning properly yet my attempt to acquire knowledge by some routine calculations may 
be frustrated if they require more written pages of formulae than I can simultaneously attend 
to and the written figures which I am not attending to mysteriously mutate or disappear.  Our 
cognitive faculties are merely abilities and, like all abilities, their successful exercise depends 
upon the conducive nature of the prevailing circumstances.  That circumstances are 
appropriately conducive is clearly a presupposition of any cognitive project in the sense 
defined: to have reason to doubt it in a particular case would indeed be to have reason to 
doubt the significance or competence of the project in question.  There will thus be an 
entitlement to take it that the prevailing circumstances are indeed conducive to the successful 
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operation of the cognitive faculties involved in the case of any unimpugned project where 
there is no antecedent reason to suppose that they are not, and where to attempt to investigate 
the matter nevertheless would throw up further, no more secure presuppositions of the same 
sort. In general, such an investigation would indeed expectably have that regressive character. 
I may, for example, investigate the stability of the figures on the paper, or scrutinise the 
environment for barn facades, but in doing so I will have to take it for granted that the 
prevailing conditions are generally conducive to the successful operation of the faculties 
deployed in these further investigations— that the appearance, sideways on, of a barn façade 
is not that of some further clever form of illusion, for instance, and that the characteristics of 
the paper, including possibly mobile figures inscribed upon them, are receptive to check by 
ordinary vision and memory.   
§7  With these ideas on the table, reflect now that there is, plausibly, a third kind of 
entitlement of cognitive project:  namely, that we are in general entitled to take it that the 
concepts in terms of which we formulate a project and its findings are in good standing.  It’s 
challenging to say what precisely, for these purposes, the good standing of a concept consists 
in.  But there are, anyway, various foreseeable ways in which a concept may fail of good 
standing.  It may be, for example, that the introduction of an expression for it into an 
otherwise consistent language generates inconsistency.  Or it may be that it of itself 
incorporates an internal inconsistency —like Frege’s concept of extension —or that its 
application canonically carries implications which canonical grounds for applying it cannot 
justify —the situation, for example, according to certain sceptical viewpoints, of the concepts 
of causation and empirical law.  Or it may merely be that the standard explanations of a 
concept leave it unclear in crucial respects that frustrate its utility.  That a particular concept 
has any of these, or other, failings is something which we can look into and perhaps, if need 
be, address.  The modern development of axiomatic set theory, for instance, represents a 
systematic attempt to address the shortcomings in the intuitive concept of set.  But it would 
be fanciful to suppose that final assurances might be achieved that any particular concept was 
in definitive good standing.  The most that one might hope to do would be to address specific 
grounds for doubt.  And in any case—more important—any investigation of the matter would 
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presuppose—or ancestrally presuppose—an antecedent conceptual apparatus whose good 
standing would have to be taken for granted.  At some point, then, even the most circumspect 
of thinkers will have to take a risk on the good standing of a conceptual apparatus in terms of 
which she exercises her circumspection and carries out whatever tests and safeguards she 
attempts to impose. 
§8 The good standing of relevant concepts is thus potentially a third type of entitlement 
of project.  This is the consideration that connects with the epistemology of implicit 
definition.  To bring out the connection, however, I have to put forward a certain general 
conception of implicit definition in general. 
 First, note that there is a sense in which the phrase, ‘implicit definition’, and the 
implied contrast with ‘explicit definition’, is apt to mislead as to the nature of the 
accomplishment involved when a definition of this kind goes well.  An explicit definition 
introduces an expression for a concept, or complex of concepts, which we are presumed to 
have independently and which are drawn on in understanding the very statement of the 
definition.  By contrast, there is no presumption that an implicit definition should serve 
merely to introduce means for the expression of antecedent conceptual resources.  Rather, in 
the most basic kind of case, implicit definition itself introduces those very conceptual 
resources —fits out a recipient with a concept or concepts that they did not have before.  We 
do not, for example, first grasp the concept of (objectual) universal quantification and then 
come to recognise that it may be implicitly characterised by the stipulation of the normal 
introduction and elimination rules.  Rather we grasp the notion by mastering (informal) 
practices of inference in accordance with those rules.  We are given it by immersion in the 
practices which those rules encode.  Implicit definition is a means whereby we enlarge our 
understanding, not just our vocabulary.   
 Next we need to reflect that, from one quite natural perspective, implicit definition is 
the only means whereby we can do this.  We do not get our concepts in advance, before we 
have any practice of making judgements involving them.  Rather one adds components to 
one's conceptual repertoire by immersion in, and by thereby acquiring mastery of judgmental 
practices in which those very components are utilised.  Broadly, such mastery involves, at a 
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minimum, learning what counts as justification for—grounds to accept—a range of basic 
judgements in which a novel concept is involved, and learning what may be taken to be the 
consequences of such a judgement's being correct.  The most basic level of mastery of a 
concept like pain, for instance, consists in knowing the circumstances under which it is 
appropriate to affirm of oneself, or others, that they are in pain, and, in the most general 
sense, in an understanding of the practical significance of pain —that it is a situation which 
normally a sufferer will want to change, and that anyone will normally wish to avoid, etc.   
 It is a matter of familiar difficulty how to divide knowledge of this kind into that 
which properly belongs with grasp of the concept in question and that which belongs merely 
with collateral empirical knowledge about it —or even whether such a divide should be 
attempted at all. However the point remains undeniable, indeed platitudinous, that having 
concepts is having capacities of judgement in which they are exercised, and that these 
capacities boil down to an understanding of the conditions under which the judgements in 
question are appropriate, and an understanding of what hangs on them.  All our acquisition of 
concepts must therefore ultimately be viewed at the acquisition of judgmental competences in 
which these two basic kinds of grasp are exhibited.  Insofar as implicit definition may be 
thought of as ‘definition in use’, it is not a poor relative of explicit definition but the 
canonical means whereby concepts are explained, the very soul of our conceptual education.   
 Here are the two key points again: first, that implicit definition is properly viewed as a 
means of conceptual, rather than merely lexical innovation; and second, that all our concepts, 
even explicitly definable ones, are ultimately grounded in implicit definition —in processes 
which explain, more or less directly, the proper basis for judgements which configure them 
and the consequences of such judgements' being correct.   
 Now, someone might want to protest at this, in a spirit of fastidiousness, that we 
should restrict the term ‘implicit definition’ to explicit, verbal codifications of such 
judgmental practices.  But we are already familiar with the idea of definition by process 
rather than statement —ostensive definition is the canonical example —and the 
epistemological point I am stressing is precisely that what is achieved by the usual kind of, if 
I may so term them, explicit implicit definitions —stipulations that certain sentences 
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containing undefined terms are to count as true, or the laying down of Gentzen-style 
introduction and elimination rules—is just the characterisation of practices which, in the 
more general run of cases, we absorb by immersion and demonstration rather than by 
description or explicit stipulation. 
 Here's the upshot. I argued that we have an entitlement of cognitive project to take it 
that concepts are in good standing, absent specific reason to think the contrary.  But our 
concepts in general are in good standing only if standard basic means for explaining them are 
effective in establishing them as such.  That standard basic means, whether it proceeds by 
explicit stipulation of grounds for and consequences of judgements which configure a given 
concept, or whether it proceeds by immersive explanation, as it were, of practices in which 
those grounds and consequences are acknowledged, is implicit definition.  So we are entitled 
to take it that implicit definition is a generally effective means of conceptual innovation and 
hence that, in the absence of specific reasons for misgivings, it is productive of concepts in 
good standing in particular cases.  That any particular —statement or process of —implicit 
definition succeeds in conveying a concept in good standing is a defeasible entitlement.  
§9  Consider, then, any statement of an implicit definition. Such a statement may take the 
form of an explicit placement of conditions on the correct use of a definiendum that it 
mentions, but the case that interests us is where the definiendum is simply used, unquoted, in 
the context of the statement of the implicit definition—call it the vehicle— and where the 
latter is simply accepted as true, as a correct constraint on the meaning of the expression it 
serves to introduce. I have just argued that, absent special reason for doubt, we are entitled to 
regard such a statement as introducing a concept in good standing.  But can that entitlement 
somehow be parlayed into a priori knowledge of the truth of the thought that, when such a 
concept is indeed successfully introduced, the vehicle will express? 
 There is a temptingly straightforward line of thought to the conclusion that a priori 
knowledge of such a thought may indeed be the result. It runs like this. When an implicit 
definition succeeds in introducing a concept in good standing, its vehicle will be true. And 
when an implicit definition succeeds in introducing a concept in good standing, we will have 
accepted it as true— since such an implicit definition only works at all, when it does work, 
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because we accept it as true. So if we are good at implicit definition—good at this kind of 
conceptual innovation—there will be a reliable correlation between our acceptances of the 
vehicles of implicit definition and the truth of the thoughts they express. On a simple 
reliabilist conception of knowledge, then, our acceptances of the vehicles of implicit 
definition will generally be knowledgeable. And since they will be acceptances in vacuo, 
uninformed by evidence of any kind, the knowledge involved will be a priori. 
 Such a conception of basic a priori knowledge will not attract those whose preference 
is that such knowledge should be, as it were, intellectually self-certifying—should be fully 
authenticated by processes of internal scanning and reflection. But that preference, it may be 
rejoined, is already under challenges connected with the fallibility of implicit definition and 
the theoretical difficulties that confront the attempt to articulate the nature of the putative 
internal scanning involved and to vindicate its credentials.  Hence a purely reliabilist— or 
perhaps a more sophisticated form of externalist— account of the basic a priori may present 
itself as something that needs to be taken seriously, at least for the object-language vehicles 
of definition in general. Is this, roughly, how we should best conceive of the possibilities of a 
priori knowledge of Hume's Principle? 
 I shall not here argue against the suggestion that it is. But what is certain is that such 
an externalist turn is unlikely to appease the critic of abstractionism who needs to be 
persuaded of the epistemic credentials of abstraction principles. Such a critic will want to be 
shown that, in the best cases—and Hume's Principle had better count as one of those—such 
principles are indeed known a priori: he will want a demonstration of their epistemic 
credentials, not a mere canvassing of congenial possibilities.  What can be said to address 
such a critic? 
§10 Hume's Principle certainly fits nicely enough with the general conception of implicit 
definition canvassed in the earlier remarks.  The right-to-left direction of its ingredient 
biconditional offers canonical grounds —the obtaining of one-one correspondences between 
an appropriate pair of concepts —for accepting a numerical identity, whose canonical 
consequences are then those respectively required by the standard logic of identity and by the 
left-to-right direction of the ingredient biconditional.  So, according to the argument above, 
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the default position should be that the stipulation of Hume's Principle suffices to fix a concept 
in good standing of (finite) cardinality and to bestow sense—or a clear enough sense— on the 
singular terms which it introduces.   
 This, though, of course, is only the default position.  It is, familiarly, open to a 
number of challenges.  There are perfectly legitimate prima facie concerns over the similarity 
of the principle to Frege’s inconsistent Basic Law V, and over the subtler ‘bad company’ 
issues brought out by George Boolos13 —(not all abstraction principles of this general shape 
can rank as acceptable stipulative implicit definitions; so which are the good cases, and 
why?)  There are legitimate concerns concerning the impredicativity of the first order 
variables in the fully expanded version of Hume's Principle, unavoidable if the proof of the 
infinity of the number series is to go through14—(does such impredicativity introduce some 
kind of vicious explanatory circle, as Dummett for one has suggested?15)  And there are 
legitimate concerns whether enough has been explained —(the real thrust of the notorious 
Caesar problem concerns the capacity of the stipulation of Hume's Principle to impart a 
semantically structured understanding of its left-hand sides and thereby to allow us 
intelligibly, as is again essential for the construction of arithmetic on this basis, to form open 
sentences out of them and to quantify into, or otherwise bind, their argument places.)  Each of 
these potential pressure points has quite properly received plenty of attention in the literature 
on the abstractionist programme.  But let us here assume—what I anyway believe to be the 
case—that the neo-Fregean can win these skirmishes and hence re-establish the default 
position:  our entitlement to regard Hume's Principle as a successful implicit definition of the 
meaning of the numerical operator and the concept of (finite) cardinal number.   
                                                
13 Boolos (1990). A sophisticated discussion of the problem has developed in the literature. See 
Linnebo, ed., (2009) for references and several useful contributions. 
14 This claim was queried by an anonymous referee for this volume, citing a result of John Burgess 
However the claim is good, and the query confused two kinds of impredicativity.  What Burgess shows 
(2005, pp. 113 and following) is that it is possible to derive the infinity of the objectual domain from 
Hume's Principle in a predicative second-order logic provided non-standard definitions are given of 
zero, natural number and successor. Even then, though, the referents if the terms introduced by Hume's 
Principle need to be taken to lie in the domain of its objectual quantifiers. For more on the multiplicity 
of notions of impredicativity relevant to the abstractionist programme, see Linnebo (forthcoming). 
15 Dummett (1998) 
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 Still, there is a further outstanding obstacle to the idea that a priori knowledge of 
Hume's Principle might be accomplished on the back of its success as an implicit definition 
and our general reliability in processes of successful implicit definition. It may be brought out 
by comparing the stipulation of Hume's Principle with the following stipulation:16  
 Jack the Ripper is the perpetrator of all these gruesome slayings of prostitutes. 
Probably no one back in the 1890s heyday of the Ripper's notoriety ever actually explicitly 
said that.  Still a practice emerged in the British news media of the day that accorded with it, 
and constituted, in effect, an implicit definitional equivalent of it.  That practice assigned 
canonical grounds to claims about Jack the Ripper —to warrant such a claim, one would have 
to warrant a corresponding claim about the unique perpetrator of the crimes.  The assigned 
logical consequences of such claims were then those proper to any such singular statement, 
with an appropriate further range of pragmatic and contextual consequences assigned by the 
association of the name ‘Jack the Ripper’ with the reference-fixing description, ‘the 
perpetrator ..’.  There seems no reason to question that this practice with the name was 
effective in the sense of establishing a common understanding of it.  Clearly, however, the 
admission of this effectiveness is less than the admission that the practice in question was 
well founded in its assumptions.  Key among those assumptions was that the crimes in 
question were indeed the work of a single individual.  That is something that we do not know 
even to this day. The critical point is thus that even if the Ripper stipulation effectively 
conveys an understanding of how the name is to be understood, it would be inadmissible 
unless its presupposition —the existence of a single unique perpetrator of the slayings —is 
true.  If that presupposition fails, the truth of the vehicle of the definition stated above fails 
with it. 
 The moral is that an implicit definition’s success in fixing a concept is one thing and 
the holding of the presuppositions of the truth of its vehicle may be something else.17  In 
effect, we must look askance at the key assumption of the "temptingly straightforward" 
                                                
16 Arguably not an implicit definition, but the point I am about to use it to make is not compromised 
by that. 
17 This important point is well made in Ebert (2005). 
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transition from successful implicit definition to a priori knowledge of its vehicle: the 
assumption, as I expressed it above, that when an implicit definition succeeds in introducing 
a concept in good standing, its vehicle will be true. The critic of abstractionism may contend 
that Hume's Principle is in like case with the explicit definition of "Jack the Ripper"; that the 
infinity of the series of natural numbers —whose derivation from Hume's Principle is 
supposed to be the crowning glory of the abstractionist reconstruction of arithmetic —is 
merely a presupposition of the admissibility of the stipulative statement of Hume's Principle.  
Our argued entitlement to the good standing of the principle as an explanation of the concept 
of (finite) cardinal number thus falls short of an entitlement to take it that it is true; a fortiori 
it falls short of an entitlement to take it that its consequences, and in particular the Dedekind-
Peano axioms, are true, —let alone that they can be known by deriving them from it.   
§11.  Before attempting to address that concern, I want to improve on the implicit 
definitional conception of the epistemological status of Hume' Principle—indeed, from one 
perspective, to surpass it.   
 It will assist us if we first consider another objection. A derivation of the Peano 
axioms from Hume's Principle cannot — surely? — even in the best circumstances, bestow 
upon them an epistemic status in any way superior to that enjoyed by Hume's Principle itself.  
Let us allow, an objector may say, that a case can be made that there is an entitlement to 
accept Hume's Principle as an effective introduction of the concept of (finite) cardinal 
number. The objection just noted resists any attempt to translate that directly into an 
entitlement to accept Hume's Principle as a truth. But suppose it is accepted that there is such 
a further entitlement. Still, whatever type of epistemic credentials we have for Hume's 
Principle, those same credentials —it appears —will be the best we get for the Dedekind-
Peano axioms on the back of Frege’s Theorem.  However the content of an entitlement of 
cognitive project is not, just on that account, an item of knowledge. If all I have right now is 
an entitlement to take it for granted that my eyes are working properly, then that they are may 
not strictly be regarded as known by me. So if what we have for Hume's Principle is, roughly, 
merely a rational permission to trust in its truth, then rational trust in the truth of the 
Dedekind-Peano axioms is, surely, is the most we can milk out of Frege's Theorem. The 
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result is accordingly not knowledge of the laws of arithmetic but a mere license, as it were, to 
proceed on the assumption that they hold.  Such a result would fall disappointingly short of 
the foundationalist spirit that abstractionism claims to inherit from Frege. But worse, it would 
amount to the failure of the abstractionist programme for arithmetic, whose target was to 
demonstrate the possibility of a priori knowledge of Peano arithmetic by supplying a model 
of how it could be accomplished. 
 This second challenge —in effect, what I have elsewhere called the leaching 
problem18—takes us into some very deep issues in epistemology.  Here I will merely offer an 
indication of what I think should be the shape of the correct abstractionist response, and of 
the framework in which further debate had best be pursued. 
§12.  We have recognised three species of entitlement of cognitive project:  to the proper 
functioning, on an occasion, of relevant cognitive faculties, to the conduciveness of the 
prevailing circumstances to the successful operation of those faculties, and to the good 
standing of the concepts essentially exercised in formulating the cognitive project concerned 
and carrying it through.  But there is clearly a fourth kind of case.  We are also entitled to rely 
on the soundness of the basic inferential machinery, if any, involved in the execution of the 
project.  Not that, if a rule of inference is challenged, we may not often be able to address the 
concern.  But addressing it is going to involve inference, and, familiarly, very often a 
seemingly unavoidable reliance upon a principle of inference in a meta-language of the very 
same pattern as the rule under scrutiny.  Since any legitimate concern about the original rule 
should, manifestly, not be assuaged by meta-theoretic reasoning of the very same pattern, it 
follows that, at least in cases where we have no antecedent reasons for misgivings about the 
rule, reliance upon it should be regarded as an entitlement. 
 There are subtleties here about which exactly are the rules of inference to which we 
may regard ourselves as entitled in this way, and to what extent a principled demarcation can 
be made between them and rules the right to use which has to be cognitively earned.  But 
                                                
18 Wright (2004) and (forthcoming). 
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however the discussion of those matters may go in detail, it's plausible to assume that the 
rules of modus ponens and conditional proof as represented by the schematic transitions: 
 {A1......An} |– A    ;    {B1......Bn} |– if A, then B  
   {A1.....An, B1....Bn} |– B 
and 
   {A1.....An} |– B 
  {A1.....An-1} |–  if An, then B 
will rank as basic entitlements of the intended kind.  Notice, crucially, that in saying this, I 
am implicitly rejecting one historically quite common conception of the epistemological 
ground of such basic rules.  In classifying the acceptance of such rules as entitlements of 
cognitive project, we affirm (i) their presuppositional status in a given (very large) range of 
cognitive projects, together with the considerations (ii) that we are possessed of no reason to 
call their soundness into question and (iii) that, were an attempt to justify them to be made, it 
would necessarily involve reliance on an inferential apparatus of no more secure an 
antecedent standing —(actually, in this case, a reliance on the very same inferential 
apparatus.)  But reflect that the last point is simply wrong if there is another, non-inferential 
way whereby the soundness of the rules in question might be recognised.  Just that possibility 
is embraced by the venerable thought that the validity of our most basic rules of inference is 
given to us by a kind of rational insight or intuition.  I make so bold as to suggest that, for 
our present purposes, the venerable thought is merely pretentious. Let me explain why.   
 I am not suggesting that there is no role for some form of non-inferential a priori 
insight anywhere in a satisfactory epistemology of logic and mathematics.  But any faculty 
that enables an agent to recognise truths needs to operate in a context where the truths in 
question are antecedently understood—you need to understand the proposition that your keys 
are on the bedside table, for instance, or that thirty-seven is a prime, before you can bring 
your perceptual, or arithmetical capacities to bear on their verification. So too, in the present 
instance, a faculty of intuition apt for the recognition of the validity of basic rules of 
inference, however exactly conceived, would need to go to work in a context where a thinker 
antecedently fully understood the conditional, e.g., but was so far open-minded about the 
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status of, say, modus ponens.  Is there any such possible state for a rational thinker to 
occupy?  
 Well, not in the view of a certain hard-line kind of inferentialism. On the hard-line 
inferentialist view, it is constitutive of an understanding of the conditional to acknowledge 
the rule of modus ponens.  So an understanding of the conditional cannot coherently be 
supposed to precede an intuitive recognition that modus ponens is valid.  If it could, there 
ought to be such a thing as understanding the conditional perfectly yet—because of a failure 
of one’s intuitive faculty rather than of understanding—failing to be arrested by the validity 
of the rule.  But, the hard-line inferentialist will contend, there is no such possibility, for no 
one will count as grasping the conditional unless they acknowledge the validity of modus 
ponens.  And that means that here there is here no work for intuition to do—no epistemic 
space for it to work in. Call this the squeezing argument. 
 Now, Timothy Williamson has recently argued that no such inferentialism can be 
right.19 Manifestly, someone can grasp the conditional and yet clear-headedly refuse to 
acknowledge modus ponens. As Williamson observes, Vann McGee is living proof.20 Indeed, 
Williamson argues that for any pattern of inference, however obvious-seeming and 
elementary, sense can be made of the possibility that someone fully understand it yet not be 
disposed to acknowledge its validity. 
 I think this line of objection is successful, but only against a needlessly crudely 
conceived version of inferentialism. The inferentialist should not deny that doubts may 
rationally be entertained about the validity of what are in fact meaning-constituting 
inferential rules; and should not deny that commonly explicitly accepted inferential rules may 
be out of kilter with each other,21 or with those rules that actually constitute the meaning of a 
                                                
19 Williamson (2003), (2006) and (2007), chs. 3 and 4. 
20  McGee (1985) 
21  This, incidentally, is the way the McGee cases actually present themselves: they are not pure 
paradoxes for modus ponens but cases where modus ponens — the elimination rule for the 
conditional— presents as inconsistent with an unspecified introduction rule somewhat to the effect that 
a conditional is assertible only if the addition to one's information of the truth of the antecedent justifies 
the affirmation of the consequent. It is because they violate the latter that the conditionals in which the 
McGee arguments conclude impress as unacceptable. 
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targeted logical operator. That a given group of rules of inference are valid is a theoretical 
claim, and may be called in question by bad though well-motivated theory, or indeed—
should they indeed contain some hitherto unnoticed flaw—by good theory. What 
inferentialism cannot accept is that someone might grasp the conditional and yet have no 
inclination, even in the absence of any theoretical doubt about their validity or coherence, to 
practice in accordance with what are in fact the rules of inference that individuate that 
operation. 
 Now, this qualified inferentialism does not, to be sure, directly support the squeezing 
argument against intuition outlined above, since it does not so immediately collapse the gap 
between understanding a targeted operation and explicit acceptance of its constitutive rules. 
The connection it makes is between understanding the conditional, e.g., and inferential 
practice in accordance with modus ponens —(allowing that subjection to modus ponens is 
indeed, pace McGee, constitutive of the conditional.) That is not, at least not immediately, to 
make any connection between understanding the conditional and acceptance of the 
proposition that modus ponens is valid. A fortiori, it is not to make a connection close enough 
to squeeze out any role for intuitional recognition of the truth of that proposition. 
 What does happen, though, is that another objection to the intuitional epistemology 
now surfaces into view. Consider a chess player who, for some reason, has never explicitly 
encountered the rule controlling the movement of the Bishop but has, as we say, picked it up 
by immersion in the practice of the game. Suppose that now, for the first time, she considers 
a formulation of the rule—say, "From the square it occupies, the Bishop may move 
diagonally, backwards or forwards, through any number of consecutively unoccupied 
squares, and may only so move." Her assent to this proposition is to be expected.  Indeed she 
may find the so-formulated rule obviously correct. But what she assents to is a proposition 
whose normative force concerns acceptable practice—that this is how the game is played. 
However the proposition that corresponds to practice in accordance with modus ponens, 
modulo performance error, in the way that that proposition corresponds to performance in 
accordance with the Bishop's rule, is not the proposition that modus ponens is valid but rather 
the proposition, roughly, that here is how to infer from a conditional, that this is how 
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conditional inference goes. A reflective assent to that proposition, based on reflection on 
one's practice, is nothing remarkable. It is of a piece with the general capacity of knowledge 
we all have of our intentions. Knowing that this is how I play is not the same thing as 
knowing that how I play is correct. In the case of the Bishop's rule, there is of course no 
further issue about correctness. But in the case of modus ponens, crucially, there is — it is 
exactly the further issue of validity.  
 In sum: when the inferentialist view ceases to be the crude hard-line view—when it 
holds instead merely that the understanding of the conditional, e.g. is given by mastery of its 
distinctive inferential role— a gap does indeed open between the understanding and the 
acceptance of any particular proposition encoding that role. But the new objection to the 
intuitional account of the epistemology of basic inference is now that there is no prospect 
whatever of justifying the description of the process that leads to such an explicit acceptance 
as implicating a recognition of validity rather than merely a becoming explicitly conscious of 
the nature of one's own inferential practice. No good theoretical motive has been provided for 
describing the matter in the former way. 
 I don't expect these remarks to silence the friends of intuition (I doubt if anything 
will), though I do think they present them with a very significant challenge. What is of 
interest here, however, is the dialectical situation if we now discard the intuitional view. 
There was already a strong case, prefigured earlier, for saying that an acceptance of the 
validity of modus ponens is at least an entitlement of cognitive project, one operative indeed 
wherever conditional inference is part of a cognitive project. But now there is also the 
makings of a case for saying that modus ponens is a rule of inference to rely on which we 
have only an entitlement of cognitive project —that no superior form of cognitive 
achievement is here possible.  
 There are various possible failings —inconsistency, epistemically irresponsible forms 
of non-conservativeness, etc. —which, in general, an inferential practice may prove to 
exhibit.  And there is, I acknowledge, a strong inclination to say that we know that our 
practice with the conditional is, insofar as we are concerned with features just attributable to 
the role of the conditional, innocent of such failings.  If we get into trouble, we are sure it 
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won't be modus ponens' fault.  But it’s hard to see what possible reason we could give 
ourselves for thinking so that would not variously rely on conditional reasoning.  Yet that 
kind of boot-strapping justification is available for any inferential rules. To be sure, for a 
theorist who wants to construe knowledge in some brutely externalist way, it can still be true 
that we do, properly speaking, know that our rules of inference for the conditional are valid 
merely in accepting them and in being, in fact, reliable in tracking validity in our basic 
logical acceptances.  But if the question is our right to claim such knowledge, then it’s hard to 
see that we are in position to do so; it is hard to see that we are better placed than to claim an 
entitlement to take it that they are valid.  I do not think that we are.22 
§13 Actually, I do not think this is a terribly surprising conclusion. That basic rules of 
inference enjoy this status —that of, so to say, mere entitlements, beneath cognitive 
achievement —is, I think, something which many would have found antecedently quite 
plausible. What is crucial, though, is that it is not a conclusion that should disturb our right to 
claim knowledge on the basis of deductions in accordance with such rules.  That is, even if 
the consequences of premises which are mere entitlements cannot, just on account of their 
being consequences, enjoy an any more robust form of cognitive status than that, it does not 
seem that the same limitation should apply to the conclusions of inferences from known 
premises drawn in accordance with rules which we are merely entitled to suppose to be 
sound.  If that were not so, then inference in general would not be a means of extending 
                                                
22 In a number of papers—see e.g. his (2001)— Paul Boghossian has argued that we need to recognize 
that warrant-productive inference can, and in certain basic cases, must be blind: that reasoning can 
produce warrant for a thinker for conclusions in cases where it is uninformed by any beliefs she has 
about its validity, indeed in cases where she may have no developed concept of valid inference at all. I 
regard this observation as correct and important. But granting that is consistent with rejecting the 
application of the idea that Boghossian makes to underwrite the suggestion that rule-circular inference 
can be warrant-productive—that someone might, for example, use modus ponens in a blind but 
warrant-productive proof of its own validity. One problem with this idea is that it is very doubtful 
whether the range of cases where blind inference can produce warrant includes inferences to 
schematically general conclusions: the sophistication involved in grasping such a conclusion requires, 
plausibly, a correspondingly general conception of the validity of the reasoning that leads to it and 
hence explicit beliefs about its validity. Cf Dogramaci (2010). But in any case our interest is in our 
right to claim knowledge of the validity of modus ponens. And where what is at issue is not just the 
inferential acquisition of knowledge of the validity of an inference pattern but the justification of a 
claim to knowledge of it, there has to be a presupposition that one is in a position to claim that the 
inferential machinery deployed is sound. Whether or not knowledge can, claims to knowledge cannot 




knowledge —not if all inference must in the end depend on the basic rules, and they are 
merely entitlements.  To be tempted by the thought that inference in accordance with merely 
entitled rules must correspondingly downgrade the status of its conclusions is to be tempted 
by a false modesty.  If we are entitled to claim that a principle of inference in sound, then we 
are also entitled to claim knowledge of a statement which we have recognised to follow from 
known premises by inference in accordance with it.  We are not restricted to a mere 
entitlement to such conclusions.   
 The point is actually quite general. In order to acquire knowledge, we do not need to 
know that the cognitive apparatus utilised can and does deliver knowledge. It is enough that it 
can and does do so. This goes for all presumed knowledge-acquisitive faculties: perception, 
memory, and reasoning of all kinds. To be sure, ascending a level, to claim to have acquired 
knowledge will require the claim that the cognitive apparatus concerned has delivered. But 
this claim can be entered as an entitlement. It does not need to be known in turn (and it 
cannot always be known in turn; though it is a fine thing when it can.) 
 The leaching worry was: if all we have, epistemically, is an entitlement to take it that 
Hume's Principle is true, deductions from it cannot generate any superior form of epistemic 
warrant than that. I have outlined two considerations that may be used to address that worry. 
First, it is arguable that even where basic but (for the majority) utterly uncontroversial 
principles of logical inference are concerned, all we have, epistemically, is an entitlement to 
take it that that they are valid.  Second, this admission does not disable them from service in 
the generation and transmission of knowledge.  Rather, being entitled to claim that they are 
valid, we are thereby entitled to claim that they are knowledge-productive.  
 If this, however, is how it is for modus ponens, it is clearly inappropriate to ask more 
of Hume's Principle. From a purely proof-theoretic perspective, of course, it makes no 
difference whether we take Hume's Principle as an axiom in a suitable second-order logic, or 
whether we take it as a pair of additional rules controlling the introduction and elimination of 
the cardinality operator. But from the perspective of the epistemology of logic, it makes a big 
difference. One needs to have a justified claim to know an axiom before derivations from it 
can justify claims to knowledge of their conclusions. One does not need to have a justified 
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claim to know that a rule of inference is valid before derivations using it can justify claims to 
knowledge of their conclusions; it is enough, ceteris paribus, that one is entitled to take it that 
the rule is valid. This entitlement is then inherited by those claims. 
 My recommendation, in summary, is that the epistemology of good abstraction 
principles should be assimilated to that of basic principles of logical inference, and that this 
involves recognising (i) that their validity is beneath knowledge, at least if knowledge in such 
cases is taken to require some form of reflectively certifiable intellectual processing; (ii) that 
this limitation is consistent with a rational entitlement to take it that such rules are valid; and 
(iii) that there is a consequential rational entitlement to take it that they are at the service of 
knowledge production and extension  by inference. If this is accepted, then the proof of 
Frege's Theorem in a system of second-order logic augmented by rules corresponding to the 
two halves of Hume's Principle can issue in an entitlement to claim knowledge of the 
Dedekind-Peano axioms. Moreover since the latter entitlement is generated purely 
inferentially, deploying only basic rules of deductive inference, the knowledge we are 
thereby entitled to claim is, if we indeed have it, a priori knowledge.  
§14 The preceding perspective, though, is hostage to the unfinished business I left at the 
conclusion of §10.  We have shifted from a deployment of the notion of entitlement of 
cognitive project that aimed to justify the acceptance of Hume's Principle as a legitimate 
implicit definition to one that aims to justify its acceptance as a pair of complementary basic 
inferential rules governing the cardinality operator. (On an inferentialist conception of the 
conceptual and semantic significance of basic inferential rules, the latter proposal is, of 
course, perfectly consonant with the former.) However whereas the former ploy was open to 
the objection that there is in general a potential gap between acceptance of a principle as an 
effective implicit definition and acceptance of the presuppositions of its truth, the latter ploy 
is surely no less open to the corresponding objection that there is in general no entitlement to 
accept new rules of inference as valid whose introductory components implicate novel and 
untested substantive claims—rules, for example, whose validity carries additional ontological 
purport not already validated in the language to which they are added. But that is just what an 
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introduction-rule corresponding to the right-to-left direction of an abstraction principle will 
do. 
 Though the epistemological context—that of the conditions for an entitlement to take 
it that proposed basic inferential rules are valid—is new, this is, of course, an issue that has 
divided discussants of the abstractionist programme from the start and has already generated 
a great deal of debate. I do not expect to be able to change entrenched contrary opinion here, 
but I will give some indication of the way I think the case for the defence should be 
conducted. 
 The worry, localised to the case of Hume's Principle, is whether there are, or with 
what right we take it that there are, any objects to serve as the referents of the numerical 
singular terms that, exploiting its right-to-left direction, we can enlist Hume's Principle to 
introduce. In the present dialectical setting, we can set to one side irrelevant general 
nominalist qualms about admitting abstract objects into one's ontology at all and focus on a 
doubter whose misgivings specifically concern the apparent ontological presumptuousness of 
abstraction principles. With what right do we take it that identity contexts of the kinds 
introduced by abstraction principles can soundly sustain quotidian first-order existential 
generalisation?  
 In response, it is notable that there is, in the case of the conditional rules, no terribly 
impressive corresponding misgiving to be had about the analogous existential generalisations 
—that is, about the Ramsey-sentences, if you like, obtained by existential generalisation on 
the places occupied by an expression for the conditional in suitable statements of the validity 
of the inference patterns licensed by the two rules.  Rather, we are, most of us, unshakeably 
convinced that the acceptance of the soundness of the conditional rules is perfectly 
warranted; and warrant to take it that the patterns of inference licensed by modus ponens and 
conditional proof are sound is eo ipso a warrant to take that there is indeed an appropriate 
such function validating those rules.23 The cautious view — that modus ponens and 
conditional proof are good provided there is any such function — seems merely neurotic. Is 
                                                
23 Prescinding, again, from irrelevant nominalist concerns about whether there are any functions at all. 
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there any basis for such confidence in the case of the conditional rules that goes missing with 
Hume's Principle, or other good abstraction principles? 
 We can manufacture a context for a non-neurotic doubt. To suppose that the 
acceptability of the patterns of inference concerned should await some independent reason to 
allow that there is such a function, — rather as the acceptability of the practices implicitly 
defining ‘Jack the Ripper’ might await independent reason to suppose there was a unique 
perpetrator of the relevant crimes, —would be sensible if the context were one where, for 
some reason, an acceptable validation required finding a candidate from within some pre-
selected domain of functions to discharge the described inferential role. For instance, the 
context might restrict us to the repertoire of binary truth-functions that feature in the standard 
semantics for classical sentential logic; then we might propose to identify the conditional 
introduced by modus ponens and conditional roof with the most eligible of these (the material 
conditional, of course.) But in general one's confidence that there is a function that answers to 
modus ponens and conditional proof does not rest on the possibility of such independent 
identification of it from within such a preselected, constrained domain. Rather, one would 
like to say, the rules concerned themselves exhibit the function—they show the conditional.  
 That, roughly, is that I want to say about good abstraction principles and the referents 
of the singular terms they introduce. They are not to be received in a reference-fixing spirit—
a spirit whereby Hume's Principle, for instance, is viewed simply as introducing a condition 
of identity that numbers, if indeed there are any, are required to satisfy.24 Rather they 
introduce us to the abstracts concerned in the manner in which—at least on an abundant 
conception of properties— an explanation of the satisfaction-conditions of a predicate 
introduces us to the property it expresses. There are conceptions of properties— various 
forms of so-called 'sparse' conception— according to which a doubt can still be entertained 
whether a predicate with well-defined satisfaction conditions actually latches on to any real 
property, a doubt whether the world co-operates in putting up a real natural distinction that 
the satisfaction-conditions in question track. But those conceptions contrast with that on 
                                                
24 Writers who very explicitly assume that abstraction principles are to be taken in such a reference-
fixing sprit include Field (1984), Boolos (1997), and Fine (1998) 
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which, once a predicate has been well-defined, there is no additional element of risk carried 
by acknowledging that there is a property— a way of being— which the predicate denotes. 
On the abundant conception, the satisfactory specification of the satisfaction-conditions of a 
predicate does not merely set a condition which any property denoted by the predicate must 
meet—viz. that it has to be a property whose instantiation by an object is ensured by its 
meeting the satisfaction-conditions in question. Rather, such a specification displays the 
property concerned. It leaves no space for an intelligent doubt about whether the world co-
operates. 25 
 What obstructs this kind of way of looking at the matter in the case of abstraction 
principles is the assumption that their ontological implications need to be redeemed by 
reference to some independently given population of objects. (Compare the kind of artificial 
context envisaged above for an intelligent doubt about the existence of the conditional.) That, 
however, is a gratuitous and, when generalised, quite misguided assumption.  There is no 
requirement that the objects in question should yet be available to thought other than under 
the very concepts of them that, e.g., Hume's Principle serves to introduce.  In order to 
recognise that there are indeed such objects, it is not required that we hit on some prior range 
of things, given to us in some other way and so comporting themselves that they are 
somehow fitted to qualify as the referents of the new numerical singular terms. Rather the 
sole means of satisfying oneself that there are indeed such objects can be by verification of 
statements involving reference to them. And indeed when we contemplate the conditions for 
justified singular thought in general, that has to be, ultimately, the pattern: on pain of regress, 
there has to be such a thing as justified thought involving a reference-demanding singular 
mode of presentation where no independent such mode of presentation is deployed in the 
justification.  The thoughts concerning abstracts that abstraction principles introduce us to 
should be received as basic singular thoughts in this sense. The requirement that some 
independent assurance be given that terms introduced by abstraction principles refer misses 
this epistemologically fundamental point.   
                                                
25 These ideas are elaborated in Hale and Wright 2009 
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§15 A great deal more needs to be said, of course.26 My intent here has merely been to 
outline some steps towards a more explicit account of the kind of epistemological stage 
setting which I believe abstractionism needs if its philosophical significance, and limitations, 
are to be properly understood.   
 One cautionary corollary of the foregoing discussion is perhaps worth a closing 
emphasis. We need to realise that the traditional conception of the basic a priori as a realm of 
apodictic certainty—a conception in which Frege was immersed up to his ears—is a great 
mistake. A priori knowledge, no less than empirical knowledge, is subject to the ultimate 
groundlessness that Wittgenstein stressed in his last philosophical writings. Here I have tried 
to outline how the abstractionist project looks when that point is taken on board — and how 
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